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Comment
MINN-CHEM AND THE NEW NORMAL: A REVITALIZED
FOREIGN TRADE ANTITRUST IMPROVEMENTS ACT
CASSANDRA BECKMAN WIDAY

For over a century, the judiciary has faced delicate questions
about the appropriateness of invoking U.S. antitrust law to
potentially hold foreign actors accountable for anticompetitive
conduct. The Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act (FTAIA)
passed in 1982 with the well-intentioned aim of establishing
guidelines in this area. However, for many of the ensuing years, the
statutory language was interpreted and applied in varying ways—
evoking great uncertainty about the potential reach of U.S. antitrust
law.
One of the most unassuming, quietly momentous FTAIA
decisions of our time, Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium Inc., signals that
these interpretations may finally be converging in a way that favors
antitrust plaintiffs seeking to bring claims against foreign
defendants. This flows from two key holdings, namely: (1) that the
FTAIA is a substantive, and not jurisdictional, statute; and (2) that
the FTAIA is governed by a proximate causation standard rather
than a strict directness standard. While the exact impact of the case
remains to be seen, by shifting the pre-trial balance of power to
plaintiffs, it stands to invite a new wave of litigation to the highstakes U.S. antitrust realm.
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MINN-CHEM AND THE NEW NORMAL: A REVITALIZED
FOREIGN TRADE ANTITRUST IMPROVEMENTS ACT
CASSANDRA BECKMAN WIDAY*
I. INTRODUCTION
In its infancy, United States antitrust law was famously directed
toward the well-caricatured domestic threats to free enterprise—such as
railroad,1 oil,2 and steel3 conglomerates—with varying degrees of success.
But in the transformative decades following these early, congressionally
sanctioned campaigns, thorny questions arose in courts as to how this
powerful body of law should apply to anticompetitive behaviors that
originate abroad.4 The statutory answer was the Foreign Trade Antitrust
Improvements Act (FTAIA).5
Though the FTAIA was designed to elucidate, it has suffered from
widely varying treatments by the judiciary.6 Minn-Chem7 is a selfcontained illustration of this point. In 2012, the Seventh Circuit issued the
Minn-Chem decision—overruling its own relatively recent precedent8 and
adopting a newly liberalized stance toward the potential reach of federal
*

University of Connecticut School of Law, J.D. Candidate 2014; Cal Poly, San Luis Obispo, B.S.
2008. I am grateful for all of my colleagues on the Connecticut Law Review, who have been
exceptionally generous with their time, insights, and good company. I am also deeply thankful for my
family’s unconditional support and encouragement. Finally, to Nicholas Bauer, for his patience and
love.
1
See generally N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904) (prohibiting the ongoing
combination of the Great Northern and Northern Pacific Railway corporations).
2
See generally Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911) (effectively disbanding the
Standard Oil Company).
3
See generally United States v. U.S. Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920) (finding that the U.S. Steel
Corporation had not operated as a monopoly).
4
See, e.g., Jonathan T. Schmidt, Note, Keeping U.S. Courts Open to Foreign Antitrust Plaintiffs:
A Hybrid Approach to the Effective Deterrence of International Cartels, 31 YALE J. INT’L L. 211, 216
(2006) (explaining that after World War II, as commerce became increasingly international, U.S.
antitrust laws began to be applied extraterritorially—a shift that was met with hostility by foreign actors
who feared being hauled into U.S. courts).
5
15 U.S.C. § 6a (2012).
6
See Christopher Sprigman, Fix Prices Globally, Get Sued Locally? U.S. Jurisdiction over
International Cartels, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 265, 270 (2005) (“Congress expected that the FTAIA would
clarify the law. It hasn’t worked out that way.”); see also United States v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co.,
109 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1997) (criticizing the FTAIA for being “inelegantly phrased”).
7
Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium Inc., 683 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc), cert. dismissed, 82
U.S.L.W. 3070 (U.S. July 22, 2013) (No. 12-650).
8
United Phosphorus, Ltd. v. Angus Chem. Co., 322 F.3d 942 (7th Cir. 2003) (en banc), overruled
by Minn-Chem, 683 F.3d 845.
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antitrust law. This stance involved two key components: (1) the view that
the FTAIA is not a jurisdictional statute, but rather sets forth the
substantive elements of a potential claim;9 and (2) the view that the FTAIA
should be governed by a proximate causation standard, rather than a strict
directness standard.10 Taken together, these dual forces considerably favor
parties seeking to bring U.S. antitrust claims against foreign defendants.
But Minn-Chem was not the first federal case to embrace either one of
the two views above.11 Instead, this Comment suggests that Minn-Chem’s
real significance stems from it being an early signal that FTAIA
interpretations are finally converging—in an expansive direction for
litigation. Such convergence is the likely result of an exogenous judicial
movement,12 as well as direct agency guidance.13 If true, under this new
status quo, there is a greater likelihood that claims of extraterritorial
antitrust violations will successfully cross the threshold of the U.S. court
system. And within the high-stakes U.S. antitrust realm—where the worst
overseas offenders may face government fines of $500 million, a rush of
follow-on litigation from private parties, and treble damages—even
marginally more hospitable rules could yield big behavioral swings by
litigants.14
9

Minn-Chem, 683 F.3d at 852.
Id. at 856–57.
11
See Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. China Minmetals Corp., 654 F.3d 462, 467–68 (3d Cir. 2011)
(holding that the FTAIA “constitutes a substantive merits limitation rather than a jurisdictional
limitation”), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1744 (2012); In re Monosodium Glutamate Antitrust Litig., 477
F.3d 535, 538–39 (8th Cir. 2007) (adopting a proximate causation standard for FTAIA claims, yet
declining to adopt an even more permissive “but-for” standard).
12
See Sylvie K. Kern, Is the FTAIA Jurisdictional? Subject Matter Jurisdiction After Arbaugh
and Reed Elsevier, COMPETITION, Fall 2010, at 108, 111 (remarking that recent Supreme Court cases
on other subject matters “arguably compel the conclusion that the FTAIA is not a jurisdictional
statute”). See generally Howard M. Wasserman, The Demise of “Drive-By Jurisdictional Rulings,” 105
NW. U. L. REV. 947 (2011) (discussing a recent push by the Supreme Court to distinguish statutes that
genuinely impose jurisdictional bars from statutes that have been incorrectly interpreted as doing so
due to overly broad readings by reviewing courts).
13
See Brief for the United States and the Federal Trade Commission as Amici Curiae in Support
of Neither Party on Rehearing En Banc at 20–30, Minn-Chem, 683 F.3d 845 (No. 10-1712) (arguing
that “directness” under the FTAIA should not require that the domestic effects follow as an immediate
consequence of the allegedly anticompetitive conduct).
14
See Thomas E. Kauper & Edward A. Snyder, An Inquiry into the Efficacy of Private Antitrust
Enforcement: Follow-On and Independently Initiated Cases Compared, 74 GEO. L.J. 1163, 1165
(1986) (“The filing of an antitrust complaint or return of an antitrust indictment sends a signal . . . .
[that] is likely to trigger the filing of private suits and influence both the perceptions of the merits of the
subsequent litigation and the conduct of the parties.”); Jeffrey M. Perloff et al., Antitrust Settlements
and Trial Outcomes, 78 REV. ECON. & STAT. 401, 408 (1996) (summarizing an analysis of antitrust
case data that revealed “changes in rules . . . that affect the probability that a plaintiff will win at trial
may substantially affect the share of cases that settle”); Steven C. Salop & Lawrence J. White,
Economic Analysis of Private Antitrust Litigation, 74 GEO. L.J. 1001, 1020 (1986) (“By increasing the
plaintiff’s recovery in the event he succeeds, a treble damages remedy increases the likelihood that a
potential plaintiff will initiate a suit.”); Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Sherman Act Violations
10
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In spite of the mounting indications that it will not stay unsettled
forever, for now, the FTAIA landscape remains inconsistent across the
circuit courts of appeals.15 While the contemporary Supreme Court’s
aggressive stance toward so-called “drive-by jurisdictional rulings” may be
motivating anticipatory reforms in some circuits, it has not yet provoked
uniform rulings on the first issue of whether the FTAIA is a jurisdictional
statute.16 Nor has the Supreme Court intervened on the matter, despite a
recent solicitation to do so.17 And though a narrowly framed petition for a
writ of certiorari did initially arise from Minn-Chem—asking the Court to
weigh in on the second issue of which causation standard should govern
the FTAIA18—it was later dismissed because the parties entered a
settlement agreement worth $110 million.19 While stability would be
welcomed in this area of law, larger questions of whether the new FTAIA
framework will adequately serve policy goals loom over the evolutionary
process.
In Part II, this Comment will first examine the FTAIA and the
circumstances that led to its codification. In Part III, it will survey the key
cases that have directly addressed the question of whether the FTAIA is a
jurisdictional statute—focusing largely on Minn-Chem—as well as some
instructive cases beyond the antitrust arena. In Part IV, this Comment will
survey the key cases that have addressed the question of which causation
Yielding a Corporate Fine of $10 Million or More, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., http://www.justice.gov/atr/pu
blic/criminal/sherman10.html (last updated Nov. 12, 2013) (cataloguing two instances where halfbillion dollar fines were levied against foreign companies).
15
Though some circuit courts of appeals that traditionally viewed the FTAIA as jurisdictional
have not yet explicitly abandoned that position, certain district courts are taking on the initiative. See,
e.g., In re Dynamic Access Memory (DRAM) Antitrust Litig., 546 F.3d 981, 985 n.3 (9th Cir. 2008)
(acknowledging apparent conflict on the question of whether FTAIA is jurisdictional, but declining to
resolve the question); United States v. LSL Biotechnologies Inc., 379 F.3d 672, 679 (9th Cir. 2004)
(concluding that the FTAIA is jurisdictional); In re TFT-LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litig., 822 F.
Supp. 2d 953, 957–59 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (concluding that the FTAIA is not jurisdictional in light of
contemporary attacks on drive-by jurisdictional rulings). But see In re Static Random Access Memory
(SRAM) Antitrust Litig., No. 07-md-01819 CW, 2010 WL 5477313, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 31, 2010)
(“Because Arbaugh did not clearly overrule the Ninth Circuit’s treatment of the FTAIA as a
jurisdictional statute, and the Ninth Circuit has not found that it did, the Court is obliged to treat the
FTAIA as jurisdictional.”).
16
See Minn-Chem., 683 F.3d at 852 (holding that the FTAIA is substantive); Carrier Corp. v.
Outokumpu Oyj, 673 F.3d 430, 438 n.3 (6th Cir. 2012) (declining to decide whether the FTAIA is
substantive or jurisdictional); Animal Sci. Prods., 654 F.3d at 469 (holding that the FTAIA is
substantive); In re DRAM, 546 F.3d at 985 n.3 (declining to decide whether the FTAIA is substantive
or jurisdictional).
17
See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Animal Sci. Prods., 132 S. Ct. 1744 (2012) (No. 11-846)
(presenting the question of whether the FTAIA is jurisdictional).
18
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Minn-Chem, 82 U.S.L.W. 3070 (U.S. Aug. 6, 2012) (No. 12650).
19
Minn-Chem, 82 U.S.L.W. 3070 (No. 12-650); Amanda Bronstad, $110 Million Antitrust
Settlement
Reached
over
Potash
Prices,
LAW.COM
(Feb.
14,
2013),
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202588089247&slreturn=20130405201503.
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standard should apply to FTAIA matters. In Part V, this Comment will
conclude with a summary of the practical and policy implications that may
flow from an expansion of the FTAIA’s reach.
II. BACKGROUND: THE FTAIA
A. Early Treatment of the Extraterritorial Reach of U.S. Antitrust Law
Though the genesis of antitrust law may be most well known as a
period when the giants of domestic industry were targeted, it did witness a
failed initial attempt to battle anticompetitive practices that transpired
abroad.20 In American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co.,21 Justice Holmes
affirmed the dismissal of a complaint that alleged federal antitrust
violations occurred on foreign soil.22 The complaint was brought by a
U.S.-based plaintiff against a U.S.-based defendant, with the latter having
allegedly used its relationships with the governments of Panama and Costa
Rica to drive the former out of its banana trade operations in those
countries.23 Justice Holmes remarked that since “the acts causing damage
were done, so far as appears, outside the jurisdiction of the United States,”
it was “surprising to hear it argued that they were governed by the act of
Congress.”24 Ultimately, dismissal was deemed proper because the
Supreme Court reasoned that the Sherman Act should be “confined in its
operation and effect to the territorial limits over which the lawmaker has
American Banana thus became
general and legitimate power.”25
emblematic of a “strict territoriality” approach that prohibited any
extraterritorial applications of antitrust law.26
As World War II came to a close, a modified approach to the
extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust laws solidified—one that was
perhaps indicative of a new geopolitical mindset.27 In the landmark case

20
See Susan E. Burnett, Comment, U.S. Judicial Imperialism Post Empagran v. F. HoffmanLaRoche? Conflicts of Jurisdiction and International Comity in Extraterritorial Antitrust, 18 EMORY
INT’L L. REV. 555, 567 (2004) (“At the turn of the twentieth century, in the infancy of antitrust
litigation, the Supreme Court was unwilling to apply the Sherman Act to conduct occurring beyond the
physical boundaries of the United States.”).
21
213 U.S. 347 (1909).
22
Id. at 353, 359.
23
Id. at 354–55.
24
Id. at 355.
25
Id. at 357.
26
See, e.g., Burnett, supra note 20, at 568 (“American Banana firmly embraced the established
territorial model of State jurisdiction.”).
27
See Austen L. Parrish, The Effects Test: Extraterritoriality’s Fifth Business, 61 VAND. L. REV.
1455, 1472 (2008) (remarking that the new effects test was “[o]ften seen as a tool for expanding
American hegemony”).
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28

United States v. Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa), Judge Learned Hand
articulated the “effects test.” Scrutinizing a quota agreement entered into
by corporate members of a Swiss-based cartel, Judge Hand wrote that
federal antitrust statutes could ensnare “conduct outside [U.S.] borders that
has consequences within its borders.”29 That is, anticompetitive conduct
abroad could come into the crosshairs of the Sherman Act if it “intended to
affect imports and did affect them.”30 Judge Hand took care to recognize
and distinguish American Banana’s principles, stating that the courts
should not punish similar conduct that did not ultimately have domestic
consequences.31
B. Post-Alcoa Turmoil and the Development of the FTAIA
Alcoa’s effects test proliferated quickly throughout the judiciary,
thereby lessening the taboo of applying U.S. antitrust law
extraterritorially.32 Perhaps, in the views of other nations and historical
critics, this move was distasteful.33 And though the effects test may have
seemed straightforward enough, courts struggled with drawing boundaries,
for—to borrow a famous quote from the antitrust realm—“everything
affects everything.”34
In response, some wary courts layered multifaceted interest-balancing
requirements on top of the effects test.35 Among some of the factors that
might be weighed before exercising antitrust authority extraterritorially
were the following: the potential degree of conflict with foreign law or
28
148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). The Second Circuit served as the highest possible appeals court
for this case because the Supreme Court could not obtain a quorum of six justices to hear it. Id. at 421.
29
Id. at 442–43.
30
Id. at 444.
31
Id. at 443.
32
See Parrish, supra note 27, at 1472 (reflecting that the effects test “gained widespread currency
among U.S. courts” and launched a new era that broke from the tradition of territoriality).
33
See, e.g., id. at 1478–79 (criticizing the effects test because it lacks a meaningful constraint on
the exercise of jurisdiction); Burnett, supra note 20, at 571–72 (“Foreign reaction to such U.S.
extraterritoriality . . . was initially critical and suggested that U.S. laws should be more explicitly
limited to reflect considerations of international comity.”). It is worth noting here that some negative
sentiment would openly linger even after the effects test was formally codified in the FTAIA. In 1991,
Janet Steiger, then the head of the Federal Trade Commission, wrote: “The views of the United States,
as a proponent of the so-called ‘effects doctrine’, and of some of our largest trading partners opposing
its application are well known.” Janet D. Steiger, Means of Competition Law Enforcement, in ORG.
FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., COMPETITION AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 145, 148 (1991).
34
See Parrish, supra note 27, at 1479 (quoting PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, 1
ANTITRUST LAW 255 (1978)).
35
Out of concerns for comity, the Ninth Circuit promulgated a jurisdictional rule of reason.
Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am. N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d 597, 613 (9th Cir. 1976). The same
concerns for comity led to the Third Circuit’s adoption of an interest-balancing approach that accorded
some discretion in deciding extraterritorial cases. Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595
F.2d 1287, 1297–98 (3d Cir. 1979).
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policy, the nationality of the parties, the locations of the businesses
involved, the extent to which enforcement might achieve compliance, and
the significance of the effects on the United States as compared with
elsewhere.36
The resulting lack of predictability in the extraterritorial application of
antitrust laws was not the legislature’s only call to arms. Beyond
clarification purposes, Congress developed the FTAIA with an eye toward
limiting the antitrust exposure of the nation’s exporters.37 The statute was
partially a response to allay concerns among businesspeople that the
ominous threat of antitrust liability was constricting joint export ventures.38
This is underscored by the fact that the FTAIA was passed alongside the
Export Trading Company Act of 1982 and the Bank Export Services Act.39
C. The Text of the FTAIA
In 1982, these historical and political forces culminated in the
codification of the FTAIA,40 which is embedded in the Sherman Antitrust
Act.41 The relevant text reads:
Sections 1 to 7 of this title shall not apply to conduct
involving trade or commerce (other than import trade or
import commerce) with foreign nations unless—
(1) such conduct has a direct, substantial, and reasonably
foreseeable effect—
(A) on trade or commerce which is not trade or commerce
with foreign nations, or on import trade or import commerce
with foreign nations; or
(B) on export trade or export commerce with foreign nations,
of a person engaged in such trade or commerce in the United
States; and
(2) such effect gives rise to a claim under the provisions of
this Act, other than this section.
36

Timberlane Lumber, 549 F.2d at 614–15.
Edward D. Cavanagh, The FTAIA and Subject Matter Jurisdiction over Foreign Transactions
Under the Antitrust Laws: The New Frontier in Antitrust Litigation, 56 SMU L. REV. 2151, 2158
(2003).
38
Id.
39
Export Trading Company Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-290, tit. I, 96 Stat. 1233, 1233–35);
Bank Export Services Act, Pub. L. No. 97-290, tit. II, 96 Stat. 1235, 1235–40 (1982).
40
Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-290, tit. IV, 96 Stat. 1246,
1246–47 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2012) and 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(3) (2012)).
41
Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2012). Notably, an analogous piece of the FTAIA is
also embedded within the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58 (2012). However, this
Comment focuses on the FTAIA’s relationship with the Sherman Antitrust Act.
37
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If sections 1 to 7 of this title apply to such conduct only
because of the operation of paragraph (1)(B), then this Act
shall apply to such conduct only for injury to export business
in the United States.42
Recall that one of the primary reasons for this statute’s existence was
to lend clarity to extraterritoriality matters. Its language has been sharply
criticized for not only failing to attain that goal but, worse still, actually
obfuscating the subject further. One detractor went so far as to say: “The
FTAIA is perhaps described as a drafting disaster, the worst nightmare of
every legislation professor.”43
In any event, this language can be synthesized into a two-prong test for
determining when anticompetitive extraterritorial conduct might be
actionable in the United States. A court may consider the following: (1)
whether the conduct has a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable
effect on domestic commerce or U.S. export business; and (2) whether the
conduct also gives rise to a claim under the Sherman Antitrust Act.
Congress intended that the second prong of this test would operate so
that—even if the first prong has been satisfied—a plaintiff would still need
to meet the normal antitrust requirements of “standing, injury, causality,
violation, damages, and so forth,” to advance an extraterritorial claim.44
The FTAIA seems to leave unanswered many of the questions that
traditionally surrounded the process of applying antitrust laws
extraterritorially. First, the statute is facially neutral regarding the
geographic locus of the triggering conduct.45 Second, it is also facially
neutral between United States citizens and non-citizens.46 This point is a
subject of much practical debate, as there are strong feelings about whether
U.S. courts should be open forums to private foreign plaintiffs seeking
antitrust remedies.47 Third, the statute does not mention international
42

Id. § 6a.
Cavanagh, supra note 37, at 2157.
44
Burnett, supra note 20, at 581 (quoting 128 CONG. REC. H18,953 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1982)
(statement of Rep. McClory)).
45
Salil K. Mehra, Deterrence: The Private Remedy and International Antitrust Cases, 40 COLUM.
J. TRANSNAT’L L. 275, 289 (2002).
46
Id.
47
See, e.g., Schmidt, supra note 4, at 258–59 (“Congress should amend section 12 of the Clayton
Act to bar jurisdiction in cases involving international cartels in which (1) neither the plaintiff nor the
defendant is a national of the United States, and (2) the plaintiff or defendant is a national of a country
that the DOJ currently lists as one that provides plaintiffs with an adequate private remedy in the
antitrust claim, except (3) when that country permits United States jurisdiction for reasons of judicial
economy. Such a law would promote international judicial economy in a transparent and predictable
manner that prevents forum shopping without greatly reducing the deterrent effect of United States
law.” (footnotes omitted)). See generally Eric Taffet, Note, The Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements
Act’s Domestic Injury Exception: A Nullity for Private Foreign Plaintiffs Seeking Access to American
Courts, 50 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 216 (2011) (positing that the judiciary’s FTAIA interpretations
43
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comity and whether—and to what extent—it should play a role in judicial
decision-making.48
Though the aforementioned concerns of interpretation are important
parts of the general FTAIA discourse, this Comment turns its focus toward
the at-large queries of whether the statute is jurisdictional and what
causation standard should control it. In theory, the causation standard is
delineated by the language targeting conduct that has “direct, substantial,
and reasonably foreseeable” effects on U.S. commerce.49 But while the
FTAIA overtly speaks to a causation standard, it has not been saved from
disparate treatments in practice.50 In contrast, the text of the FTAIA
nowhere mentions jurisdiction. This silence persists despite legislative
history indicating that the FTAIA was intended be jurisdictional in
nature.51
III. THE QUESTION OF JURISDICTION
A. Precepts
Subject matter jurisdiction empowers a court to hear and resolve a
dispute; substantive causes of action grant parties permission to bring those
cases before a court.52 Both are necessary for a case to be litigated.53
Whether a statute is treated as jurisdictional or substantive may have
important consequences affecting the pre-trial balance of power. All other
things being equal, a court’s choice of one of these labels over the other
could substantially increase the likelihood of settlement for the antitrust
cases falling within its jurisdiction.54
Motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction are brought
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). In these scenarios,
prevent foreign private plaintiffs from accessing American courts, and suggesting that this result is
positive to the extent that it inhibits international forum shopping for antitrust disputes).
48
Burnett, supra note 20, at 591. During Congressional debates, it was argued that the FTAIA
would not foreclose judges from using discretion in declining to hear cases—rather, comity
considerations could still be weighed after the FTAIA’s application. Id. at 590. The statute’s complete
silence on this front only resulted in confusion. Id. at 591. In Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v.
California, the Supreme Court recognized that the capacity for courts to consider comity in FTAIA
cases was unclear, but nonetheless declined to answer the question because “international comity
would not counsel against exercising jurisdiction in the circumstances alleged here.” 509 U.S. 764, 798
(1993).
49
15 U.S.C. § 6a(1) (2012).
50
See infra Part IV (discussing judicial treatments of the FTAIA’s causation standard).
51
See H.R. REP. NO. 97-686, at 11 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2487 (“This bill only
establishes the standards necessary for assertion of United States antitrust jurisdiction. The substantive
antitrust issues on the merits of the plaintiff’s claim would be unchanged.”).
52
Howard M. Wasserman, Jurisdiction and Merits, 80 WASH. L. REV. 643, 676 (2005).
53
Id.
54
Perloff et al., supra note 14, at 408. Of course, in any given individual antitrust case there may
be other defenses or strategic advantages weighing against settlement.
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the plaintiffs bear the burden of proof in demonstrating that subject matter
jurisdiction exists.55 Further, in evaluating 12(b)(1) motions, courts do not
need to presume that the factual allegations in the complaint are true.56
Courts can also consider extrinsic evidence while deliberating on the
motion.57 Dismissals for lack of subject matter jurisdiction can occur at
any time in the lifespan of a suit—from its inception to appeal—and may
be granted sua sponte.58
By contrast, motions to dismiss for substantive maladies are brought
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). In these situations,
the pleadings are now reviewed pursuant to the ubiquitous Twiqbal
standard to see if they contain sufficient factual matter that, if true,
plausibly states a claim for which relief might be granted.59 At this stage,
since the truth of the factual matters pleaded is presumed, the tilt may favor
prospective plaintiffs.60 Further, the court may only look to the complaint
in making a determination, and not to extrinsic documents.61
Taken in combination, these distinctions between jurisdictional and
substantive treatments play significant roles in the viability of an FTAIA
claim. Where the FTAIA is interpreted as a jurisdictional statute, a
plaintiff must shoulder the responsibility of demonstrating—as a
preliminary matter—that it meets all of the Sherman Antitrust Act’s
requirements.62 Thus, migrating away from the jurisdictional framework
may ultimately make the FTAIA a much more plaintiff-friendly tool.
B. The End of Drive-By Jurisdictional Rulings
Following its enactment, the FTAIA was viewed predominantly as a
55
Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (citing McNutt v. Gen.
Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 182–83 (1936)).
56
1 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S MANUAL: FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 11.20(2)(b) (Matthew Bender & Co. 2013).
57
Id.
58
Id. § 11.20(1).
59
See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint
must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.’” (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007))); Jeffrey W. Stempel, The
Worst Supreme Court Case Ever? Identifying, Assessing, and Exploring Low Moments of the High
Court, 12 NEV. L.J. 516, 521 (2012) (“Ashcroft v. Iqbal, along with Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, has
changed the face of modern pleading and Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 motion practice and are [sic] sufficiently
closely associated that law professors have come to refer to them as ‘Twiqbal.’”). For an overview of
how the Twiqbal standard has affected antitrust suits, see Gregory G. Wrobel, Michael J. Waters &
Joshua Dunn, Judicial Application of the Twombly/Iqbal Plausibility Standard in Antitrust Cases,
ANTITRUST, Fall 2011, at 8.
60
See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (“When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should
assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.”).
61
MOORE ET AL., supra note 56, § 11.24(3)(a).
62
Recall that the second prong of the FTAIA requires a showing that extraterritorial conduct
gives rise to a claim under the Sherman Antitrust Act. See supra text accompanying note 42.
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jurisdictional limitation to the Sherman Antitrust Act. For many years,
this approach was embraced without much controversy at the circuit
level.64
By the mid-2000s, however, the Supreme Court began taking a harsh
look toward so-called “drive-by jurisdictional rulings.”65 In the Court’s
view, many statutes were improperly being treated as jurisdictional despite
their being silent about jurisdiction. The problem was that legal matters
were being disposed of for lack of subject matter jurisdiction without a
thorough consideration of whether Congress explicitly intended for the
statute to operate with such effect. Thus began the Court’s mission to
create very distinct lines between jurisdictional and substantive statutes.66
At least one scholar views this endeavor as a sign of the Court’s renewed
enthusiasm for engaging civil procedure topics under Chief Justice
Roberts.67
Though it has not yet ruled on the FTAIA, the Court has struck down
attempts to label silent statutes as jurisdictional in many other subject
areas. In 2006, the Supreme Court ruled in Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp.68 that
statutory requirements are jurisdictional only if the pertinent statute clearly
states that they are.69 Otherwise, the requirements simply define
substantive elements of a claim.70 At issue in this sexual harassment case
was the Civil Rights Act’s statutory limitation on covered employers—i.e.,
those with fifteen or more employees71—which a unanimous Court held
was not jurisdictional in nature.72 The Court reasoned that the employee
threshold appeared in a separate section from the statutes conferring
jurisdiction, and that the limitation did not “speak in jurisdictional terms or
refer in any way to the jurisdiction of the district courts.”73 Thus, Arbaugh
seemed to articulate a bright line rule: Congress must expressly include the
magic language of “jurisdiction” within the same discrete portion of a
statute before it can be deemed jurisdictional in nature.74
63
Edward Valdespino, Note, Shifting Viewpoints: The Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act,
a Substantive or Jurisdictional Approach, 45 TEX. INT’L L.J. 457, 458–59 (2009).
64
See id. at 459 (observing that, as of 2009, the circuits uniformly interpreted the FTAIA as a
jurisdictional statute—yet astutely predicting that “the prevailing winds may be changing”).
65
Wasserman, supra note 12, at 947.
66
Id. at 948.
67
See Howard M. Wasserman, The Roberts Court and the Civil Procedure Revival, 31 REV.
LITIG. 313, 317–18 (2012) (citing the elimination of “drive-by jurisdictional rulings” as one example of
a type of civil procedure project undertaken by the Roberts Court).
68
546 U.S. 500 (2006).
69
Id. at 515–16.
70
Id. at 516.
71
Id. at 503.
72
Id. at 516.
73
Id. at 515 (quoting Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 394 (1982)).
74
See id. at 515–16 (“If the Legislature clearly states that a threshold limitation on a statute’s
scope shall count as jurisdictional, then courts and litigants will be duly instructed and will not be left
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The march against drive-by jurisdictional rulings went onward. In
2010, the Court held in Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick75 that the
Copyright Act’s registration requirement was not a jurisdictional bar.76
The registration requirement dictates that a party must have registered their
copyright before filing a copyright infringement claim.77 Writing for the
Court, Justice Thomas opined that this portion of the Copyright Act “is not
clearly labeled jurisdictional, is not located in a jurisdiction-granting
provision, and admits of congressionally authorized exceptions. . . . [T]hus
[it] imposes a type of precondition to suit that supports nonjurisdictional
treatment under our precedents.”78
That same year, the attack on drive-by jurisdictional rulings made the
jump to securities law. In Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd.,79
Justice Scalia addressed the issue of whether section 10(b) of the Securities
and Exchange Act could be applied extraterritorially to misconduct by
foreign defendants that harmed foreign plaintiffs in securities transactions
on foreign exchanges.80 Justice Scalia insisted that extraterritoriality was a
merits question rather than a jurisdictional question.81 As he put it, “to ask
what conduct § 10(b) reaches is to ask what conduct § 10(b) prohibits,
which is a merits question.”82 Compartmentalizing the issues, Scalia
posited that extraterritoriality has nothing to do with the court’s jurisdiction
and everything to do with whether, in enacting the statute, Congress
asserted regulatory power over the challenged conduct.83 Subject matter
jurisdiction—i.e., a tribunal’s power to hear a case—was deemed an
entirely distinct question.84
Taken together, Arbaugh and its sister cases seemingly advance a
“plain language” method of statutory construction. Where a particular
provision within a statute does not expressly address whether courts should
have the ability to adjudicate a particular type of case, that issue will not be
imputed.85 Nor will the Court conflate matters of substance and
to wrestle with the issue. But when Congress does not rank a statutory limitation on coverage as
jurisdictional, courts should treat the restriction as nonjurisdictional in character.” (footnote omitted)
(citation omitted)).
75
130 S. Ct. 1237 (2010).
76
Id. at 1241.
77
17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2012).
78
Reed Elsevier, 130 S. Ct. at 1247 (citation omitted).
79
130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010).
80
Id.
81
Id. at 2877.
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
Id.; see also Wasserman, supra note 12, at 949 (“Justice Scalia’s position presumes that there is
something essential, definable, and recognizable as ‘jurisdiction’ that is, and must remain, distinct from
substantive merits.”).
85
In this way, the movement to end drive-by jurisdictional rulings might be deemed an inevitable
cause célèbre of the more conservative justices. See John F. Manning, Justice Scalia and the
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jurisdiction even though it might be argued that they implicitly overlap.
Morrison is telling on this point, for the inherently geographical character
of the legal subject at hand was not alone sufficient to constrain courts
from hearing cases.
Though this approach might seem strict, it can be applauded to the
extent that it incentivizes clarity and precision in legislative drafting. It
also provides stability by preventing the lower courts from coloring a
statute as jurisdictional at their discretion. Further, where there is a record
of legislative intent that the statute should serve as a jurisdictional bar—as
in the case of the FTAIA86—Congress need only memorialize that intent
within the confines of the statute. Congress, of course, still retains the
power to rewrite statutory provisions and explicitly classify them as
jurisdictional proscriptions.
C. Predecessors to Minn-Chem
The Supreme Court considered the diverse statutory provisions
discussed above—governing sexual harassment, copyright, and
extraterritorial securities laws—and ruled that they were not jurisdictional
in nature. However, it has not done the same for the FTAIA. In light of
the limitations of its annual docket and the need to address myriad pressing
national legal controversies, perhaps the Court believed that the bright
lines of Arbaugh and company were sufficiently instructive for the lower
courts. For the most part, this apparent belief holds true. Following in the
highest court’s trend of ending drive-by jurisdictional rulings, various
circuits seem to be gradually coming to reason on their own accords that
the FTAIA is not a jurisdictional statute.
In 2003, just before the advent of the Roberts Court and the attendant
decline of drive-by jurisdictional rulings, the Third Circuit decided United
Phosphorus, Ltd. v. Angus Chemical Co.87 The essential finding was that
the FTAIA served as a limit to subject matter jurisdiction.88 At the time,
this result was relatively uncontroversial, as it left a long line of precedent
undisturbed.89 But in her dissent, Judge Diane Wood reasoned that
“[l]anguage like that of the FTAIA, stating that a law does not ‘apply’ in
certain circumstances, cannot be equated to language stating that the courts
Legislative Process, 62 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 33, 36–37 (2006) (“As Justice Scalia has put it, the
enacted text always trumps ‘unenacted legislative intent.’” (quoting INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S.
421, 453 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring))); see also Wasserman, supra note 67, at 317–18 (emphasizing
the relationship between the Roberts Court and the campaign against drive-by jurisdictional rulings).
86
See supra note 51.
87
322 F.3d 942 (7th Cir. 2003) (en banc), overruled by Minn-Chem Inc. v. Agrium, Inc., 683
F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc).
88
Id. at 952.
89
Id. at 951–52.

2013]

MINN-CHEM AND THE NEW NORMAL

323

do not have fundamental competence to consider defined categories of
cases.”90 Judge Wood was a black-robed Cassandra of sorts, as roughly a
decade later she delivered the majority opinion of Minn-Chem—which
overruled United Phosphorus.91
The contemporary shift toward treating the FTAIA as a substantive
statute began in 2011 with Animal Science Products, Inc. v. China
Minmetals Corp.92 The plaintiff-appellants were domestic purchasers of
magnesite, who alleged that Chinese exporters were engaging in pricefixing in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act.93 On appeal was the
district court’s dismissal of a complaint for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction under the FTAIA.94 Looking to the changing tides, the Third
Circuit vacated the district court’s decision and remanded the cause for
further proceedings.95 It duly noted the directives of Arbaugh and the
modern need to “differentiat[e] between statutory elements that serve as a
predicate to establishing a successful federal claim for relief on the merits,
and statutory elements that define a federal court’s adjudicative
authority.”96 Applying Arbaugh’s bright line rule, the Third Circuit noted
the FTAIA’s total silence on the jurisdiction of federal courts and
concluded that the FTAIA could not be interpreted as a jurisdictional bar.97
Some change is also percolating in the district courts, meaning that
more circuits may soon have occasion to similarly decide the modernized
question of whether the FTAIA is jurisdictional. For example, within the
Ninth Circuit, where the issue has not been broached at the appellate level
since Chief Justice Roberts took his post,98 some trial courts are
independently bucking the FTAIA’s jurisdictional label. In an order
denying a joint dispositive motion regarding certain claims,99 one court
opted to follow the holding of Animal Science Products, deciding that “the
90

Id. at 955 (Wood, J., dissenting).
Minn-Chem, 683 F.3d 845. For a reflective summary of this turn-about in Judge Wood’s own
words, see Diane P. Wood, When to Hold, When to Fold, and When to Reshuffle: The Art of
Decisionmaking on a Multi-Member Court, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 1445, 1467–68 (2012).
92
654 F.3d 462 (3d Cir. 2011).
93
Id. at 464.
94
Id.
95
Id. at 471.
96
Id. at 466.
97
Id. at 468–69.
98
The emphasis here is that the issue has not been answered by the Ninth Circuit in the postArbaugh era. In a case that closely pre-dated Arbaugh, the FTAIA was treated as a limit on subject
matter jurisdiction. See United States v. LSL Biotechnologies, 379 F.3d 672, 683 (9th Cir. 2004)
(affirming district court’s dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the FTAIA). More
recently, the Ninth Circuit declined to answer the question. See In re Dynamic Access Memory
(DRAM) Antitrust Litig., 546 F. 3d 981, 985 n.3 (9th Cir. 2008) (declining to answer the question of
whether the FTAIA is a jurisdictional or substantive statute because the point was not argued by the
parties).
99
In re TFT-LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litig., 822 F. Supp. 2d 953 (N.D. Cal. 2011).
91
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FTAIA does not affect subject matter jurisdiction.” However, other trial
courts appear more hesitant to act without clear top-down leadership from
the Ninth Circuit.101
D. Minn-Chem
Enter Judge Wood,102 joined by—among others—her fellow Seventh
Circuit jurists, lecturers at the University of Chicago Law School, and
general antitrust heavyweights Frank Easterbrook and Richard Posner. In
Minn-Chem,103 the plaintiff-appellees accused several global producers of
potash (a mineral used in agricultural fertilizers and other various chemical
products) of price-fixing in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act.104 In
their complaint, the plaintiff-appellees asserted that more than half of the
world’s potash reserves are located in Canada, Russia, and Belarus.105
Relatedly, seven companies hailing almost exclusively from those locales
allegedly produce roughly seventy-one percent of the world’s potash
supply.106 At the threshold, Judge Wood paused to underscore that
homogenous commodities like potash are especially vulnerable to pricefixing.107
The relevant thrust of Minn-Chem begins with the now-familiar
question of whether the FTAIA controls subject matter jurisdiction or,
alternatively, outlines the substantive provisions of extraterritorial antitrust
claims. Without hesitation, Judge Wood reflected upon the prominent
roles that the FTAIA’s legislative history and precedent played in United
Phosphorus—the dead man walking.108 She then recounted the emergence
of Supreme Court edicts to consider jurisdiction much more cautiously, as
was done in Morrison, Arbaugh, and Reed Elsevier.109 Now it was the
Seventh Circuit’s turn to join the Third Circuit in reconsidering the specific
impact of these cases on interpreting the FTAIA.
100

Id. at 959.
See In re Static Random Access Memory (SRAM) Antitrust Litig., No. 07-MD-01819 CW,
2010 WL 5477313, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 31, 2010) (“Because Arbaugh did not clearly overrule the
Ninth Circuit’s treatment of the FTAIA as a jurisdictional statute, and the Ninth Circuit has not found
that it did, the Court is obliged to treat the FTAIA as jurisdictional.”).
102
Minn-Chem was penned by a particularly well-suited author. See Diane P. Wood,
AMERICANBAR.ORG, http://apps.americanbar.org/antitrust/at-bios/wood-diane.pdf (last visited Aug. 22,
2013) (providing a biography of Judge Wood and noting her antitrust scholarship and service within the
Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice).
103
Minn-Chem Inc. v. Agrium, Inc., 683 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc), cert. dismissed, 82
U.S.L.W. 3070 (U.S. July 22, 2013) (No. 12-650).
104
Id. at 848.
105
Id.
106
Id. at 849.
107
Id. at 848.
108
Id. at 851.
109
Id. at 851–52.
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Judge Wood neatly and succinctly encapsulated that interpretation:
We add briefly that the interpretation we adopt today—that
the FTAIA spells out an element of a claim—is the one that
is . . . more consistent with the language of the statute . . . .
When Congress decides to strip the courts of subject-matter
jurisdiction in a particular area, it speaks clearly. The
FTAIA, however, never comes close to using the word
“jurisdiction” or any commonly accepted synonym. Instead,
it speaks of the “conduct” to which the Sherman Act (or the
Federal Trade Commission Act) applies. This is the
language of elements, not jurisdiction.110
The emphasis placed on the explicit language of the FTAIA cannot be
understated. By doing so, Minn-Chem embraced the bright-line rule of
Arbaugh that requires Congress to openly declare its intentions to give
jurisdictional effect to a statutory provision—within that same provision—
before courts will do so themselves.
Judge Wood later told an audience of antitrust enthusiasts that MinnChem “tied up a bit of old business” and that this procedural element of the
decision did not seem “cert-worthy . . . [because it was] very solidly
grounded in Supreme Court cases.”111 While this outcome may not seem
revolutionary in light of the recent momentum working broadly against
drive-by jurisdictional rulings,112 Minn-Chem nonetheless serves as an
important cornerstone as we contemplate the future of extraterritorial
antitrust cases. Symbolically, it represents more than an esoteric
procedural change, as the early pre-trial balance of power in FTAIA cases
has decidedly shifted in favor of potential plaintiffs. Because early
motions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction have ostensibly been removed
from the arsenals of FTAIA defendants, at least one means of avoiding
expensive discovery has been foreclosed. For now, the practical effects of
this change are speculative—will it actually produce a greater volume of
antitrust litigation against foreign actors? If so, will diplomatic tensions
expedite congressional revisions to the FTAIA so that it does qualify as a
jurisdictional statute?
Significantly, in the absence of Supreme Court guidance that is
custom-tailored to the FTAIA, some circuit courts do appear prepared to
take cues and find that the statute is substantive and not jurisdictional.
110

Id. at 852.
The Honorable Diane Wood, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Luncheon
Address at the American Antitrust Institute’s Sixth Annual Private Antitrust Enforcement Conference
(Dec. 4, 2012), available at http://antitrustinstitute.org/~antitrust/content/6th-annual-private-antitrustenforcement-conference.
112
See discussion supra Part III.B.
111
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This apparent convergence is a success story for self-reformation beneath
the Supreme Court.
IV. THE QUESTION OF THE PROPER CAUSATION STANDARD
A. Predecessor to Minn-Chem
Recall that the FTAIA ensnares conduct that “has a direct, substantial,
and reasonably foreseeable effect” on U.S. commerce.113 Unfortunately,
the statute lacks a section devoted to definitions—and even such a simple
word as “direct” can be tortured in the hands of attorneys.114 What exactly
constitutes a “direct” effect under the FTAIA is the subject of a recent split
between the Ninth and Seventh Circuits. And unlike the first contest of
whether the FTAIA is a jurisdictional or substantive statute, this second
conflict seems more likely to be settled on the basis of administrative law.
In 2004, the Ninth Circuit issued its decision for United States v. LSL
Biotechnologies.115 The defendants had entered into a joint business
venture with Hazera to develop genetically modified tomato seeds that
would ensure a longer shelf life.116 Unlike their tomatoes, the business
relationship quickly spoiled.117 Following mediation, the defendants and
Hazera added a restrictive clause to their contract, which prevented Israelbased Hazera from selling the tomato seeds in North America.118 The
United States filed suit, alleging that the restrictive clause violated the
Sherman Antitrust Act.119 Declining the United States request to adopt the
“effects test” from Alcoa120—which was so liberally and inconsistently
interpreted121—the Ninth Circuit instead opted to use the exact wording of
the FTAIA.122 (The Alcoa effects test would have made any conduct
actionable so long as it had “some substantial effect in the United
States,”123 regardless of whether that effect was direct.) Borrowing a
113

15 U.S.C. § 6a(1) (2012); see supra Part II.C.
Nor is a dictionary enlightening. See Brief for the United States and the Federal Trade
Commission as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party on Rehearing En Banc at 20 n.6, Minn-Chem
Inc. v. Agrium, Inc., 683 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 2012) (No. 10-1712) (“The 1981 edition of Webster’s
Third New International Dictionary, published one year prior to the enactment of the FTAIA, contained
seven primary meanings for ‘direct’ in the archival form, encompassing 31 more specific, subsidiary
meanings.” (citing WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 640 (1981))).
115
379 F.3d 672 (9th Cir. 2004).
116
Id. at 674.
117
Id.
118
Id. at 675.
119
Id.
120
United States v. Alcoa, 148 F.2d 416, 444 (2d Cir. 1945); see supra text accompanying notes
29–31.
121
See supra notes 32–34 and accompanying text.
122
LSL Biotechnologies, 379 F.3d 672 at 679.
123
Id. (quoting Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 796 (1993)).
114
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definition of “direct” that had been deemed appropriate for the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act, the Ninth Circuit held that—for FTAIA
purposes—an effect would be direct if it “follows as an immediate
consequence of the defendant’s activity.”124 Relatedly, an effect would not
be considered direct if it was dependent on intervening, uncertain
developments.125 Therefore, under LSL Biotechnologies, any intervening
break in the causal chain between a defendant’s conduct and the alleged
effect would prevent the ultimate application of the Sherman Antitrust Act.
This direct causation standard is favorable to prospective defendants, as it
serves to narrow the universe of conduct that will trigger liability under the
FTAIA.
B. Minn-Chem
In 2012, the Seventh Circuit decided Minn-Chem,126 seemingly
creating a rift on what standard of causation properly governs the FTAIA.
Minn-Chem benefitted from an amicus brief submitted by the Department
of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), which posited
that an effect should qualify as “direct” under the FTAIA so long as it was
“reasonably proximate” to the conduct.127 Writing for the Seventh Circuit,
Judge Wood found this amicus brief to be persuasive.128 Rather than
viewing “direct” in a singular fashion, she reasoned that the phrase “direct,
substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect” should operate as an
integrated clause within the FTAIA.129 As a result of this semantic
exercise, Minn-Chem held that—for FTAIA purposes—the term “direct”
should mean “a reasonably proximate casual nexus.”130 In contrast to the
holding of LSL Biotechnologies, this proximate causation standard is more
plaintiff-friendly because it expands the scope of conduct that may trigger
liability under the FTAIA.
For now, these divergent interpretations ostensibly stand as law in their
respective circuits. Although the foreign-based defendants of Minn-Chem
filed a petition for a writ of certiorari that presented the question of
whether the Ninth Circuit or Seventh Circuit articulated the proper
causation standard, the Supreme Court recently dismissed that petition.131
124

Id. at 680.
Id. at 681.
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Minn-Chem Inc. v. Agrium, Inc., 683 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc), cert. dismissed, 82
U.S.L.W. 3070 (U.S. July 22, 2013) (No. 12-650). For the overarching facts of the case, see supra Part
III.D.
127
Brief for the United States and the Federal Trade Commission as Amici Curiae in Support of
Neither Party on Rehearing En Banc at 21, Minn-Chem, 683 F.3d 845 (No. 10-1712).
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Minn-Chem Inc., 683 F.3d at 856–57.
129
Id. at 857.
130
Id.
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Minn-Chem, 82 U.S.L.W. 3070 (No. 12-650).
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An answer from the Supreme Court was thus avoided altogether for a
settlement price tag of $110 million.132 Curiously, the latent question of
international comity was very much entangled in this matter—the Queen of
Saskatchewan, Canada, submitted an amicus brief in support of the
petitioners.133
Query, though, what might transpire if the causation standard were to
be scrutinized under the forces of additional litigation. Because the DOJ
and FTC directly proffered an interpretation concerning the FTAIA, which
they administer, some classic questions of administrative law arise. Did
Congress speak sufficiently to the precise question at issue by using the
lone word “direct” within the FTAIA, or was that word sufficiently
ambiguous as part of a tripartite causation standard to invite additional
agency interpretation?134 If one supposes that Congress did leave sufficient
ambiguity behind, was the agencies’ interpretation of the word “direct”
based on a permissible construction of the statute?135 Only time will tell
whether other parts of the federal judiciary will follow in Minn-Chem’s
footsteps by readily accepting the proximate causation standard proffered
by the DOJ and FTC.
IV. CONCLUSION
The extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust law has ebbed and
flowed in cycles of overexpansion and contraction. The FTAIA, initially
thought to be a statutory remedy for these fluctuations, has not always been
interpreted uniformly throughout the nation’s court system. In the thirty
years since its enactment, the FTAIA had typically served as a foreign
defendant’s tool that, early on, could frustrate attempts to haul the
company into federal court. But modern changes seem to indicate that we
are entering a new period where U.S. antitrust law may have a more
extensive reach abroad.
First, as the campaign against drive-by
jurisdictional rulings has gained steam, the circuit courts of appeals appear
to be converging and have displayed a newfound willingness to interpret
the FTAIA as a statute that sets forth the substantive elements of an
antitrust claim. This will generally make it more difficult for FTAIA
defendants to obtain dismissals early in the litigation timeline. Second, an
132

Bronstad, supra note 19.
Brief for Amicus Curiae Her Majesty the Queen in Right of the Province of Saskatchewan,
Canada, in Support of Petitioners, Minn-Chem, 82 U.S.L.W. 3070 (No. 12-650).
134
See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984)
(“First, always, is the question whether Congress has spoken directly to the precise question at issue. If
the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must
give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”).
135
See id. at 843 (“[I]f the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the
question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the
statute.”).
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unresolved conflict exists as to whether a strict “directness” or more liberal
“proximate” causation standard should govern FTAIA claims. As an
adopter of the more liberal standards, Minn-Chem serves as the symbol of
a revitalized FTAIA.

